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The Greening Garden: Equality 
Rights Under the Canadian 
Constitution 
D. Geoffrey Cowper, Q.C.* 
I. SUMMARY 
In the 2003 term the Supreme Court of Canada pronounced two 
unanimous judgments finding that section 15 equality rights had been 
violated. In both cases, the Court applied the Law v. Canada (Minister 
of Employment and Immigration)1 analysis and did not retreat from the 
features of its section 15 jurisprudence which have previously attracted 
criticism in this and other venues. This paper provides a review of these 
two recent cases with a view to assessing whether they represent an 
emerging consensus and, particularly, with a view to where they suggest 
future controversy. 
II. 2003 DEVELOPMENTS — OVERVIEW 
The Court pronounced unanimous judgments in Trociuk v. British 
Columbia (Attorney General)2 and Nova Scotia (Workers’ Compensa-
tion Board) v. Martin; Nova Scotia (Workers’ Compensation Board) v. 
Laseur.3 In Trociuk,4 the Court overturned sections of the Vital Statistics 
Act5 which permitted a mother who did not acknowledge the father to 
select and register the child’s name, and to omit the father’s particulars 
on the basis the statute unconstitutionally excluded participation of the 
                                                                                                                                
*  Partner with Fasken Martineau DuMoutin LLP, in Vancouver, British Columbia. 
1  [1999] 1 S.C.R. 497, [1999] S.C.J. No. 12. 
2  [2003] 1 S.C.R. 835, [2003] S.C.J. No. 32. 
3  [2003] 2 S.C.R. 504, [2003] S.C.J. No. 54. 
4  Trociuk, supra, note 2, at para. 47. 
5  R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 479, ss. 3(1)(b), 4(1)(a) and 3(6)(b). 
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biological father in the registration and naming process on the basis of 
sex. 
In Martin,6 the Court held that Nova Scotia’s Workers’ Compensa-
tion Regulations,7 which excluded chronic pain from the reach of regu-
lar compensation and provided in lieu a functional restoration program, 
constituted an unconstitutional exclusion of benefits on the grounds of 
physical disability.  
III. ANALYTIC OVERVIEW  
The Court’s jurisprudence in section 15 has been criticized as being 
vague and incapable of ready application. The divisions within the 
Court in equality cases have been criticized as indicative of a lack of 
consensus and institutional leadership from the Court.8 The unanimous 
judgment in Law has been criticized as a compromise of several differ-
ent concepts that fails to provide ready guidance to the lower Courts. 
Despite these criticisms, these two unanimous judgments make it clear 
that the Court is holding to the Law test.9 
1. The Law Test 
In upholding the Law10 test, the Court has also reaffirmed the central 
role of human dignity in its reasoning:  
The sole remaining question under the Law test is whether, from the 
perspective of the reasonable claimant, the present differential effects 
constitute a violation of dignity…11 
 
                                                                                                                                
6  Martin, supra, note 3, preamble. 
7  Workers’ Compensation Act, S.N.S. 1994-95, c. 10, s. 10B — Functional Restoration 
(Multi-Faceted Pain Services) Program Regulations, N.S. Reg. 57/96. 
8  S. Lawrence, “Section 15(1) at the Supreme Court 2001-2002: Caution and Conflict 
in Defining ‘The Most Difficult Right’” (2002) 16 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. (2d) 103; C.D. Bredt and 
A. Dodek, “Breaking the Law’s Grip on Equality: A New Paradigm for Section 15” (2003) 20 
Sup. Ct. L. Rev. (2d) 33. 
9  Law, supra, note 1, at para. 88. 
10  Law, supra, note 1. 
11  Trociuk, supra, note 2, at para. 13. 
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Further, from Martin:12 
On the contrary the denial of the reality of the pain suffered by the 
affected workers reinforces widespread negative assumptions held by 
employers, compensation officials and some members of the medical 
profession, and demeans the essential human dignity of chronic pain 
sufferers. The challenged provisions clearly violate s. 15(1) of the 
Charter.13 
It remains unclear, however, what analytical role human dignity plays in 
the reasoning of the Court. In both cases, it may be said that offending 
human dignity compendiously describes the conclusion of the discrimi-
nation analysis rather than serving as an element in the analytical 
framework.  
2. Perspective 
The Court has also held steadfast to adopting a claimant’s reason-
able perspective. As has been noted by the Court, this approach marries 
both objective and subjective elements. The Court clearly is concerned 
not to adopt a purely subjective perspective, but also wishes to realize 
the remedial goals of section 15 by viewing the impact of legislative 
distinctions from the claimant’s viewpoint. Once again, however, the 
analytical role this element plays is unclear. The subjective/objective 
blend offers a dominant influence to either the subjective element of 
perspective, or the objective element of reasonableness depending on 
the case. If the Court concludes a distinction is reasonable, then a claim-
ant would be unreasonable in refusing to acknowledge this from his or 
her perspective. On the other hand, adopting the perspective of a claim-
ant appears to be no more than paying due regard to the impact of the 
distinction on those adversely affected — something for which a subjec-
tive analysis is arguably unnecessary. 
                                                                                                                                
12  Martin, supra, note 3, at para. 66. 
13  Martin, supra, note 3, at para. 5. 
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3. Levels of Scrutiny 
The Court has consistently rejected the notion of incorporating the 
American jurisprudence respecting differing levels of scrutiny depend-
ing upon the ground of distinction. Nevertheless, the Court is develop-
ing a jurisprudence in which different concerns apply to different 
categories. For example, the cases suggest that claims based on age 
discrimination attract less initial scepticism and are permitted a more 
rough and ready usage than distinctions based upon race or disability. 
Although the Court is not developing levels of scrutiny as expressly 
differential tests, it appears that as cases are decided, other cases involv-
ing the same ground of distinction may be of greater importance rather 
than the general concept of human dignity. Certainly, the Martin14 case 
evidences the Court’s concern that particular attention be had to the 
requirements of substantive equality and accommodation where physi-
cal or mental disability is at issue. 
One of the contextual factors identified in Law raises the varying 
impact of categories by recognizing that the nature of the distinction is 
important in assessing whether its use is discriminatory. In Andrews. v. 
Law Society of British Columbia15 McIntyre J. identified the level of 
scrutiny analysis as taking place largely within section 1, and contrasted 
that express provision with the judicially created superstructure in U.S. 
jurisprudence: see also R. v. Chaulk.16 Nevertheless, the result in Cor-
biere v. Canada (Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs)17 and the 
right to vote cases suggest that a strict approach has been taken to cases 
involving an individual’s right to an effective vote. 
The practical collision in the United States between the strict scru-
tiny analysis adopted for racial distinctions and the desire for innovation 
in affirmative action programs has been avoided expressly through sec-
tion 15(2) of the Charter. Certainly the U.S. jurisprudence also has come 
under similar criticism as failing to provide a predictable or certain 
                                                                                                                                
14  Martin, supra, note 3.  
15  [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143, [1989] S.C.J. No. 6. 
16  [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1303, at para. 168, [1990] S.C.J. No. 139. 
17  [1999] 2 S.C.R. 203, [1999] S.C.J. No. 24. 
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analytical framework for equality cases.18 Difficulties of theory and 
application are not confined to Canadian issues. 
IV. TROCIUK V. BRITISH COLUMBIA (ATTORNEY GENERAL) 
1. Reasoning in the Courts 
This case concerned a claim arising from a paternity suit com-
menced by an unacknowledged father for, amongst other relief, an order 
that the birth registry include his particulars and that the surname of the 
triplets reflect both parents’ surnames in hyphenated fashion. In the 
result the Court ordered the father’s particulars included, and referred 
the question of the children’s surname to the lower Court to be deter-
mined in accordance with the amended legislation and the best interests 
of the children. This case is one of the shortest decisions authored by the 
Court in recent years and disposes of the entire case in 47 paragraphs. 
The reasoning is admirably clear and readily followed. Finally, the re-
sult seems to flow from a philosophical premise that few would dispute: 
the social value of both fathers and mothers being involved in signifi-
cant ways with their children whether or not parental conflict exists.  
Nevertheless, more is troubling about the reasoning in Trociuk19 
than reassuring. The Court unanimously overturns the majority judg-
ment in the Court of Appeal. The majority of that Court considered the 
specific interests affected by the statute had far less of a human rights 
dimension than appears to have been the conclusion in the Supreme 
Court. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court’s statement of the parental 
interests affected fails, in my view, to persuasively connect the general 
policy of parental involvement with an unreasonable distinction made 
by the statutory framework.  
The Vital Statistics Act20 of British Columbia provided a biological 
mother with the ability to submit a Statement of Live Birth on her own 
and to choose whether to acknowledge the biological father. Under the 
Vital Statistics Act,21 where the father is unacknowledged by or unknown 
                                                                                                                                
18  Peter Rubin, “Reconnecting Doctrine and Purpose: A Comprehensive Approach to 
Strict Scrutiny After Adarand and Shaw” (2000) 149 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1. 
19  Trociuk, supra, note 2. 
20  Vital Statistics Act, supra, note 5. 
21  Id. 
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to the mother, she has the statutory responsibility to file a statement and to 
give a surname to the child. If a statement was registered by the putative 
father, the Director was required to alter the registration of birth on the 
application of a mother if she did not acknowledge the father. In Tro-
ciuk,22 the father and mother were estranged and she gave birth to triplets. 
Various court orders for access, custody and support were obtained by the 
father and the mother.  
The trial judge dismissed the claim.23 The majority in the Court of 
Appeal in two separate reasons dismissed the claim, with Prowse, J.A. 
dissenting.24  
The two statutory points at issue concerned:  
 
1. the father’s particulars on the birth registry; and  
2. the unilateral selection of a surname by the biological mother. 
 
The father maintained in the Courts below that he had sedulously done 
what he could to maintain his relationship with his children, to respect 
their mother, and to participate fully in their lives.25  
The material filed by the Director indicated that five per cent of 
births at the time of trial did not include the father’s particulars. The 
impression deposed to by the Director was that this was most commonly 
the product of the absence of any relationship with the father, as well as 
births associated with sexual assault, incest and more than one possible 
father.26 
Justice Southin in the Court of Appeal dedicated the bulk of her rea-
sons to an interesting history of the custom, common law and statutory 
history of British Columbia and other jurisdictions in relation to naming. 
The most interesting for present purposes is her observation that at 
common law there was no lawful restraint (aside from fraud) in adopt-
ing whatever name one wished. Before the 14th century, surnames were 
                                                                                                                                
22  T. (D.W.) v. British Columbia (Attorney General) (1999), 67 B.C.L.R. (3d) 389, 
[1999] B.C.J. No. 1146 (S.C.) [hereinafter “Trociuk, B.C.S.C.”]; affd (2001), 200 D.L.R. 
(4th) 685, 90 B.C.L.R. (3d) 1, [2001] B.C.J. No. 1052 ( C.A.). 
23 Id. 
24  T. (D.W.) v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [2001] B.C.J. No. 1052, 90 
B.C.L.R. (3d) 1 [hereinafter “Trociuk, B.C.C.A.”] 
25  Trociuk, B.C.S.C., supra, note 22, at para. 6. 
26  Trociuk, B.C.S.C., supra, note 22, at para. 18. 
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unknown, and people were known by their given name and place, i.e., 
Thomas of Ottawa.27 Halsbury’s Laws of England notes that at common 
law an illegimate child was not entitled to a surname by right of inheri-
tance but could acquire one by reputation.28 
Justice Prowse noted that a mother’s exclusive right to register the 
child’s birth was only provided for in 1962.29 
After 1987 it was a joint responsibility except where the father was 
unacknowledged, unknown or incapable.  
Curiously, the mother maintained that she had refused to acknowl-
edge the father because he insisted the children bear his surname only. 
In the Supreme Court he asked that an order be made giving them the 
hyphenated name of both parents.30 
The Supreme Court found that both interests were important means 
of participating in the life of a child. As to the father’s particulars: 
Including one’s particulars in a birth registration is an important means in 
participating in the life of a child. A birth registration is not only an 
instrument of prompt recording, it evidences the biological ties between 
parent and child and including one’s particulars on the registration is a 
means of affirming these ties.31 
The Court noted that in the absence of particulars being included, a 
father might not qualify for notice under the Adoption Act.32 However, 
the statute provided that upon proof of paternity or if a man was the 
subject of orders for access, custody or support that he would thereafter 
be entitled to notice under the Adoption Act.33  
Second, participating in the process of determining a child’s sur-
name was found to be a significant right: 
 Contribution to the process of determining a child’s surname is 
another significant mode of participation in the life of a child. For many in 
our society, the act of naming a child holds great significance. As Prowse, 
                                                                                                                                
27  Trociuk, B.C.C.A., supra, note 24, at paras. 33-35. 
28  Halsbury’s Laws of England, 3d, Vol. 3, (London: Butterworth & Co. (Publishers) 
Ltd., 1953), at para. 161, citing Co. Litt. 3b. 
29  Trociuk, B.C.C.A., supra, note 24, at para. 105. 
30  Trociuk, B.C.S.C., supra, note 22, at para. 1. 
31  Trociuk, [2003] S.C.J. No. 32, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 835, headnote. 
32  R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 5. 
33  Id., at s. 13(2)(c). 
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J.A. notes, naming is often the occasion for celebration and the surname 
itself symbolizes for many, familial bonds across generations (paras. 138-
39).34 
The Court concluded that arbitrary exclusion of the father from these 
means of participation constituted adverse statutory distinctions which 
required the Court to analyze whether a reasonable claimant would view 
these as demeaning to his dignity.  
The Court dismissed the argument that because the father was not a 
member of a historically disadvantaged group, he could not bring a 
section 15 claim. Quite rightly, the Court pointed out that the legislature 
was declaring that a father’s relationship with his children was being 
unequally treated in the circumstances of the legislation. For that reason, 
the Court concluded: 
a reasonable claimant would perceive the message to be a negative 
judgement of his worth as a human being.35  
The Court then proceeded to deal with a less obvious effect of the legis-
lation. The Court held that excluding the claimant from participation 
associated him with two other categories of fathers: fathers unacknow-
ledged for valid reasons and fathers incapable or unknown. The associa-
tion with these other categories of what might be termed “deadbeat 
dads” was concluded to be pejorative.  
Further, the Court found that the association with these other fathers 
communicated a stereotype or prejudice on the basis of being male.  
The Court concluded that the absence of any redress for arbitrary 
exclusion with respect to particulars and surnames was disrespectful to 
fathers wishing to participate in their children’s lives. Before the Su-
preme Court of Canada’s judgment, the Vital Statistics Act36 had been 
amended to provide a mechanism for participation by unacknowledged 
fathers as to the father’s particulars, but not as to surname.  
The provisions under the Adoption Act37 referred to in the Court of 
Appeal and the Supreme Court of Canada providing for a father’s right 
                                                                                                                                
34  Trociuk, supra, note 31, at para. 17. 
35  Id., at para. 21. 
36  Vital Statistics Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 479, ss. 3(6)(d) and (6.1), as am. Health Plan-
ning Statutes Amendment Act, 2002, S.B.C. 2002, c. 15, s. 23. 
37  Adoption Act, supra, note 32, ss. 13(1)(c), 13(2)(a). 
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to notice expressly incorporated the right of a father to register himself 
as the biological father, and to be given notice of a proposed adoption. 
Indeed, the right to notice expressly included the plaintiff, who was 
entitled by reason of section 13(2)(c) of the Adoption Act38 to have his 
consent required to any adoption by reason of his paternity order and 
access and custody order. 
Curiously, the Vital Statistics Act39 provided the “casting vote” in 
the event of a disagreement between two known parents with respect to 
surname by providing that children shall be named by hyphenated name 
with their parents’ names organized in alphabetical order. To avoid the 
growth of hyphenated names, the Act provided that a parent’s hyphen-
ated name only qualifies for the child’s hyphenated name as to one of 
the two and again in alphabetical order. Mr. Trociuk was not entitled to 
demand that his children be named as proposed by him to the court 
because he had not filed a birth registration under the Act. Nevertheless, 
the Name Act40 then provided that any custodial parent could apply for a 
change of name and required the other parent’s consent only if that 
parent wished to change the surname over to the other parent’s name. 
Otherwise, a change of name could be had over the objection of the 
other parent if that parent’s consent was withheld unreasonably. 
Finally, the Court rejected the suggestion that there was an amelio-
rative purpose to permitting women alone to register births in those 
circumstances so as to encourage registration and reduce parental con-
flict. The Court found that arbitrary exclusion of the father from the 
activity of naming a child and registering particulars of the birth was not 
in the best interests of a child. 
With respect to section 1 justification, the Court found that the exis-
tence of alternative statutory mechanisms such as the amended regime 
demonstrated that the father’s rights were not impaired as little as possi-
ble by the previous statutory regime. The amended regime permitted a 
father to require his particulars be included, but left the mother’s initial 
power to unacknowledge and unilaterally put a name in place. 
                                                                                                                                
38  Id. 
39  Vital Statistics Act, supra, note 5, s. 4.1(2). 
40  Name Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 328. 
86  Supreme Court Law Review (2004), 24 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
 
2. Remedy 
The Court determined that an immediate declaration of invalidity 
might harm mothers who might reasonably want to unacknowledge 
fathers for legitimate reasons. Accordingly a suspension of the declara-
tion of validity for 12 months was granted. Second, the Court declined 
to determine the surname of the children or to agree with the father that 
the surname reflects the hyphenated name of both parents. The Court 
concluded: 
The amended legislation provides a procedure at which Mr. Trociuk can 
apply to have his particulars included on the birth registration … this 
Court is not in a position to determine whether the asked-for change of 
surname is in the best interests of the children and, absent the consent of 
both parents, this surely must be considered before an order to change the 
surname can be made.41 
The Court concluded by saying that any adequate legislative response 
must account for the variety of interests discussed by the Court: 
including the legitimate interests of the mother, the right of the father not 
to be discriminated against on the basis of his sex and the best interests of 
the child.42 
3. Commentary 
The other members of the Court clearly had no difficulty signing on 
to this brief and lucid determination of unconstitutionality. The Court’s 
reasons, however, are open, in my respectful view, to serious criticism.  
One of the central criticisms of the concept of human dignity is that 
it is vague, general, and malleable and does not play any genuine ana-
lytical role in shaping or influencing the analysis in any given case. 
Certainly in Trociuk43 the use of the term human dignity associated with 
the interests identified does not add to the persuasiveness of the analy-
sis. 
                                                                                                                                
41  Trociuk, supra, note 31, at para. 44. 
42  Trociuk, supra, note 31, at para. 45. 
43  Trociuk, supra, note 31. 
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What is most helpful is that the Court is extremely clear in identify-
ing the interests which it says are offended as a matter of an equality 
analysis. Are those interests, however, persuasively engaged? 
The essence of the earlier statutory policy appeared to be that all 
births have to be registered. Where a mother did not acknowledge a 
father she was permitted to (and indeed required to) register the birth 
and name independently of the biological father. 
This function appears to be primarily administrative and under-
standable. Given that births should be registered within 30 days it does 
not appear sensible to require a judicial process associated with the form 
of registration. In circumstances where the father is present but unac-
knowledged, any form of registration of his particulars would require a 
determination of paternity which is provided for under different statu-
tory procedures. In this case, the mother did not acknowledge the plain-
tiff’s paternity, which had to be proved by DNA testing. 
This observation appears to have been borne out by subsequent leg-
islative changes. The province of British Columbia in response to the 
judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada on May 20, 2004 pronounced 
into force an amended regime which provides that the court may, in 
declaring a child’s parentage, make an order that the registration of a 
child’s name be changed and empowering the court to select the sur-
name of either parent or a surname consisting of a hyphenated or com-
bined name of both parents’ surnames. On the application, the 
legislation provides that the court must consider the child’s best interests 
if the child is 12 years or younger and otherwise have the child’s written 
consent. On this order being made, the registration of birth is amended 
to reflect the order and any birth certificate is thereafter issued “as if the 
original registration had contained that name”.44 This statutory fiction 
addresses the original exclusion by, in effect, erasing the official history. 
In effect, the previous power of a custodial parent to apply to 
change a child’s name has now been broadened to include any parent on 
a successful paternity action based on the child’s best interests. It cer-
tainly appears that the court’s desire for participation by both mother 
and father on an equal basis in the ultimate naming of a child has been 
accomplished in the amended legislation. However, that equal participa-
tion is at the well of the court contending for the court’s favour. It has, 
                                                                                                                                
44  Vital Statistics Act, supra, note 5, s. 4.1. 
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in effect, transferred a unilateral power in one parent to an adjudicative 
power in the court. We have no experience with how this Solomonic 
power will be administered, but there are few obvious anchors in reason 
to dictate a surname in the best interests of a child. 
In the dissent in the Court of Appeal and now the Supreme Court of 
Canada the fact that the father whose particulars are registered must 
receive statutory notice of a proposed adoption was emphasized as rep-
resenting a real statutory significance to appearing on the particulars on 
the registry. However, once paternity is established, then statutory no-
tice of an adoption had to be provided anyway under the principal Act. 
This statutory distinction does not appear to have had any real signifi-
cance. 
As an aspect of ascertaining disputed paternity, any regime which 
permits a father to intervene for the purpose of having his particulars 
noted on the registry must accommodate the necessity of proof of pater-
nity. In any event however, can it be suggested persuasively that it is 
unconstitutional to require an unacknowledged father to pursue proof of 
paternity prior to being entitled to notice of a purported adoption? Any 
alternative must somehow cope with women who refuse to acknowledge 
the father of the child, and the necessity of proving paternity. 
Justice Newbury in the Court of Appeal noted that the mother had 
agreed prior to the Court of Appeal hearing to have the father’s particu-
lars included in the registration.45 Accordingly, the only relief specific to 
the parties granted by the Supreme Court (i.e., including the father’s 
particulars) had not been in issue between the parties since prior to the 
Court of Appeal hearing. 
On this point, Newbury J.A.’s reasons concurring in the result in the 
Court of Appeal seem preferable. She identifies the purposes of the 
statute under consideration relating to the registration of births, and 
distinguishes it from the other statutes which govern paternity and the 
rights and obligations arising from paternity. She carefully addresses the 
question of whether the Vital Statistics Act46 has the purpose or effect of 
offending unacknowledged fathers and concludes that to the degree it 
                                                                                                                                
45  Trociuk, B.C.C.A., supra, note 24, at para. 172. 
46  Vital Statistics Act, supra, note 36. 
(2004), 24 S.C.L.R. (2d) The Greening Garden 89 
 
does it arises from a rational balancing of the interests involved and not 
any discriminatory purpose or effect.47  
It could well be that the Charter has had its most salutary effects on 
previously unnoticed injustices. Its application to this relatively unno-
ticed indignity does appear, however, to have more symbolic than real 
justice about it. The fact that the mother had previously agreed to 
change the particulars and that no real relief was granted in respect of 
the children’s surnames supports the sense that despite being a unani-
mous application of section 15(1) that it will soon be more curiosity 
than precedent. 
Fathers have in western cultures placed some stock in having a 
dominant influence in the selection of the surname of their children. I 
suspect that naming has largely been culturally governed by the relevant 
rules and customs of the particular society by means of paternal, mater-
nal or other association. In most western systems, the paternal system of 
naming was reflected in the automatic assignment of a father’s surname 
to any children born to a lawful marriage.48 
Where a child was born outside of a lawful marriage, the multiple 
burdens placed upon single mothers were the source of much anguish. 
In the absence of a conclusion of paternity and judicial findings of pa-
ternal responsibility a natural legislative choice with respect to surnames 
would appear to be to permit that surname to be selected by the biologi-
cal mother. 
Was this exclusion of an unacknowledged father arbitrary? It ap-
pears to follow from the natural distance between a father and child 
where the father is not acknowledged. Although that distance may not 
be wholly the father’s doing, it is a product of a social failure: the ab-
sence of a relationship that would at least sustain a conversation about 
the child’s name! The Court saves its clearest concern for the interests 
of unjustifiably unacknowledged fathers without reference to the tradi-
tional concern: any father who had a child out of wedlock carried at 
least some responsibility for the absence of a family to be born into. 
The rising portion of the Canadian population who choose not to marry 
before having children, or who choose to have children outside of marriage, 
likely made a different legislative regime necessary. Mr. Trociuk’s claims 
                                                                                                                                
47  Trociuk, B.C.C.A., supra, note 24, at paras. 176-87. 
48  Halsbury’s, supra, note 28. 
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(although dismissed at the time) appear to have been the cause for the initial 
amendments to the British Columbia legislation which permitted a father to 
file an Order of the Court declaring the child’s paternity with the conse-
quence that his particulars would then be included in the registration of 
birth. 
However, in circumstances of parental conflict (even in many cases 
where there is no such conflict) the selection of a name requires a cast-
ing vote. In the present case the Court determined that it would not find 
what was in the best interests of the child but that it would declare the 
present regime to be invalid and require that any further regime take 
account of the best interests of the child as well as the father’s interests. 
With respect, it does not appear to this writer that the exclusion of 
unacknowledged fathers from the Act represented an arbitrary exclusion 
and that the analysis of section 15 merely replaced the Court’s policy 
judgment as to how to resolve the obvious conflict (by judicial or inde-
pendent determination of a child’s best interests) in substitution for 
giving responsibility for making that choice of the child’s best interests 
to the biological mother, or the custodial parent under the Name Act.49 
With respect, it is telling that the reasons offer no content to the 
child’s best interests in this context. What are the child’s best interests 
in the circumstance such as that found in the case itself? It appears that 
the parents had a fractured relationship resulting in the circumstance 
where the father had to obtain judicial orders to prove his paternity and 
to obtain access. How are the children’s best interests then to be deter-
mined? Their names could be changed if the father succeeded in estab-
lishing that it was in the best interests of the child for the mother not to 
be the custodial parent. As a starting measure, however, surely it is a 
reasonable policy to conclude that it is in the best interests of children 
where the mother does not acknowledge the father for her to be entitled 
to register their birth and select their names. Is the court in a better posi-
tion to determine a child’s best interests than the mother or custodial 
parent? Is the child’s best interests sufficiently ascertainable by judicial 
method or even clear enough to support a legislative judicial decision? 
This is a case where requiring the legislature to address the individual 
interests irrespective of sex appears to be more symbolic than real and 
without any compelling addition to the justice of the legislative regime. 
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A final irony is that the revised regime endorses hyphenated surnames 
(ordered alphabetically), which equally preserves and distances children 
by name from their parents.  
V. NOVA SCOTIA (WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD) V. MARTIN 
In Martin50 the Court unanimously found that the exclusion of 
chronic pain sufferers from a general compensation structure was an 
unconstitutional discrimination on the basis of disability. 
The two central questions arising from the case are whether it is 
consistent with previous jurisprudence and whether it represents a hu-
man rights debate rather than a disagreement over a matter of legislative 
tools and policy. 
1. Reasoning 
The legislative regime at issue arose from the difficulty of Workers’ 
Compensation systems addressing the circumstances of occult, chronic 
pain. Rather than continuing to deal with chronic pain complaints on an 
individual basis, a regulation was passed which, as noted by Cromwell 
J.A. in the Court of Appeal, constituted: 
…legislative judgment … that for Workers’ Compensation purposes, the 
loss of earnings or permanent impairment flowing from chronic pain are 
not reasonably attributed to the injury ….51 
The Regulation defined chronic pain as follows: 
The FRP Regulations and s. 10A of the Act define “chronic pain” as 
“pain”: 
(a) continuing beyond the normal recovery time for the type of 
personal injury that precipitated, triggered or otherwise predated the 
pain; or 
(b) disproportionate to the type of personal injury that precipitated, 
triggered or otherwise predated the pain,  
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and includes chronic pain syndrome, fibromyalgia, myofascial pain 
syndrome, and all other like or related conditions, but does not include 
pain supported by significant, objective, physical findings at the site of the 
injury which indicate that the injury has not healed. 
The Court of Appeal had found that chronic pain sufferers were not 
members of a group suffering historical disadvantage or stereotyping 
and that the interests affected by the denial of benefits were merely 
economic in nature and that the legislative regime was a response to the 
reality of the complex circumstances of chronic pain in the context of 
Workers’ Compensation benefits and did not demean the human dignity 
of the claimants.  
The legislative response identified by the Court of Appeal and aris-
ing from the terms of the regulation included the fact that expert advice 
appeared to support the view that chronic pain treatment was best deliv-
ered by encouraging an early return to work and that the statutory defi-
nition of chronic pain included an element of mystery with respect to the 
persistence of the pain itself. The regulation appears to have defined 
chronic pain sufferers not merely as those suffering long-term pain, but 
those suffering long-term pain where the original injury did not appear 
to afford an explanation for the persistence of symptoms and there was 
no objective medical evidence supporting the ongoing experience of 
debilitating pain.52 
In Martin,53 Gonthier J., writing for the Court, justified the conclu-
sion in clear and reasonably brief reasons. The two most compelling 
points in the Court’s reasoning appear to be: (1) the statute adopted a 
regime in which persons were excluded from compensation benefits by 
express reference to their disability; (2) unlike previous judgments of 
the Court, the claimant was not challenging the WCB system, but rather 
seeking to participate on equal terms with those suffering other forms of 
disability. 
To a greater degree than in Trociuk,54 the court reviewed the par-
ticular elements in the Law55 test. The Court determined that differential 
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treatment had been established on the basis of comparison with the 
group of workers under the Act who did not have chronic pain and are 
eligible for compensation.56 In reviewing the relevant ground of dis-
crimination, the Court rejected the argument that since both members of 
the claimant’s group and the comparative group suffer from physical 
disabilities, there was no differential treatment on the basis of physical 
disability. It held that it is sufficient that “…ascribing to an individual a 
group characteristic is one factor in the treatment of that individual”.57 
The Court identified the existence or absence of proof that the dif-
ferential treatment is discriminatory in the substantive sense as critical 
to the inquiry. In reviewing the four contextual factors identified in 
Law58 to be used in determining whether discrimination has been estab-
lished, the Court made it clear that not all factors will be relevant in 
each case. Accordingly, the fact that chronic pain sufferers could estab-
lish no history of invidious stereotypes was unimportant if they could 
establish a lack of correspondence between the differential treatment 
imposed by the Act and the true needs and circumstances of the claim-
ant’s group. In reviewing the second contextual factor of the degree of 
correspondence with the needs and circumstances of the claimants, the 
Court again identified the importance of determining the overall purpose 
of the legislative scheme at issue and how it responds to the actual 
needs, capacity or circumstances of those in the claimant group having 
regard to their value as human beings and as members of Canadian 
society, in short their essential human dignity as individuals.59  
As already mentioned, at the core of the result was the Court’s con-
clusion that the provisions of the Act which exempted those suffering 
from chronic pain as defined by the Regulations from the general provi-
sions of the Act and restricting them to functional restoration program 
and cut-off of benefits was a blanket exclusion on the basis of physical 
disability. In effect, the Court found that the reality of the claimant 
group is that: 
[frequent pain] frequently evolves into a permanent and debilitating 
condition. Yet, under the Act and the FRP Regulations, injured workers 
                                                                                                                                
56  Martin, supra, note 50, at para. 71. 
57  Id., at para. 76. 
58  Law, supra, note 55. 
59  Martin, supra, note 50, at paras. 92 and 94. 
94  Supreme Court Law Review (2004), 24 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
 
who develop such permanent impairment as a result of the chronic pain 
may be left with nothing: no medical aid, no permanent impairment or 
income replacement benefits, and no capacity to earn a living on their 
own. This cannot be consistent with the purpose of the Act or with the 
essential human dignity of these workers.60 
Despite acknowledging that “classification and standardization are in 
many cases necessary evils”,61 the Court concluded that: 
On the contrary, the treatment of injured workers suffering from chronic 
pain under the Act is not based on an evaluation of their individual 
situations, but rather on the indefensible assumption that their needs are 
identical. In effect, the Act stamps them all with the “chronic pain” label, 
deprives them of a personalized evaluation of their needs and 
circumstances, and restricts the benefits they can receive to a uniform and 
strictly limited program.62 
Dealing with the other two contextual factors, the Court concluded that 
the ameliorative purpose of the Workers’ Compensation systems gener-
ally cannot shield “an outright failure to recognize the actual needs of an 
entire category of injured workers…”.63 Finally, it held that the interests 
in receiving Workers’ Compensation benefits went beyond the eco-
nomic level, and that the exclusion from benefits reinforces the stereo-
type that chronic pain is not “real” and does not warrant individual 
assessment or adequate compensation. 
2. Section 1 Analysis 
The Court was able to dismiss the section 1 justification offered by 
the province briefly on the basis that the central point that the regula-
tions appear to be aimed at ensuring that the resources of the compensa-
tion scheme are directed to workers who are genuinely unable to work. 
While acknowledging that the Act and regulations were rationally con-
nected to that objective, the fact that the blanket exclusion applied to all 
claims connected to chronic pain, in the words of the Court, “… makes 
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it patently obvious that the challenged provisions do not minimally 
impair the equality rights of chronic pain sufferers”.64 
In essence, it held that a blanket exclusion did not evidence a prin-
cipled response to chronic pain. 
As in Trociuk65 the Court identified the “message” being sent by the 
legislative structure. In Martin66 the message was that chronic pain 
sufferers as a whole were malingerers and not suffering genuine injury 
like other WCB claimants. 
The reasoning of the Court gives rise to at least three significant 
concerns: 
 
1. The regulation did not appear to (notwithstanding the labelling) 
exclude all persons suffering from chronic pain, but rather only 
those suffering from chronic pain where their initial injury did 
not appear to explain its persistence and where no objective evi-
dence supported its ongoing reality. 
 While there can be no doubt that a suspicion of malingering 
surrounds these cases, are they as a distinct body of persons suf-
fering a similar disability, or do they represent instead a popula-
tion of Workers’ Compensation claimants whose benefits were 
restricted by reason of the character of the evidence in support of 
their claim? Would it be unconstitutional to confine compensa-
tion to objectively verifiable injuries? 
2. The Court appears to have accepted that the consensus of expert 
evidence is that persons suffering chronic pain without objective 
underlying conditions are best treated by being encouraged to re-
turn to work and hence being removed from the compensation 
system, or at least its benefits. This raises the difficult tension be-
tween the traditional suspicion of malingering and the more gen-
erous, but nevertheless similar concern, that the existence of 
ongoing disability payments may in fact interfere with a person 
returning to a full life, as well as result in an unjustified drain on 
the compensation fund. 
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3. Is this a debate in which a human rights dimension is truly 
raised? The arbitrary character of Workers’ Compensation sys-
tems arose very early in the section 15 jurisprudence when wid-
ows complained about their exclusion from the tort recovery 
system without regard to their particular circumstances. Those 
complaints were dismissed without counsel for the respondents or 
government intervenors being called upon in the Nova Scotia 
Workers’ Compensation reference in 1989: Reference re Work-
ers’ Compensation Act 1983 (Nfld.).67 However, this previous 
analysis was based explicitly on an analogous grounds analysis 
which stated that survivors of workers killed in the workplace 
were not a disadvantaged group suffering historical disadvantage 
or stereotype. 
 
 More recently, the necessity for blunt (if not arbitrary) legisla-
tive distinctions in any compensation system was addressed by the 
Court in Granovsky v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Im-
migration)68 where the Court unanimously dismissed a complaint 
based upon the differing qualification periods for disability as be-
tween those suffering permanent disability and those suffering pe-
riods of temporary disability. In that case, persons suffering 
permanent disability were entitled to claim the benefit of dropout 
provisions which relieved them of having to pay into the compen-
sation system for the same period as others. Nevertheless, persons 
suffering serial temporary disabilities were not entitled to claim the 
benefit of the same dropout provisions. The Court unanimously 
found that there was no human rights dimension to this type of dis-
tinction and that government needed to be allowed to manage a 
compensation scheme (particularly one having insurance-like 
components) embodying periods of qualification and the like that 
might embody differences between similarly situated groups. 
 Certainly it could be argued by persons suffering a number of 
periods of temporary disability that they are being treated as ma-
lingerers by not receiving similar dropout credits to those suffer-
ing more chronic disabilities. 
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COMMENTARY: The heart of the Court’s reasoning in Mar-
tin69 revolves around the obvious refusal of the legislature to take 
an individualized approach to the problem of chronic pain. In es-
sence, the Court has held that in relation to selecting who may or 
may not participate in a comprehensive compensation scheme, as 
well as the various conditions of qualification and determination 
of benefits, the Court recognizes that legislatures must standard-
ize and classify. However, within the scheme itself the Court has 
recognized a substantial role for section 15 to require a consis-
tency of approach across all forms of disability. In essence, the 
Court has found that however uncomfortable and administra-
tively difficult, genuinely disabled persons suffering from condi-
tions which are difficult to diagnose and treat must be dealt with 
individually rather than by reference to their condition.  
 
From an analytical point of view, the four contextual factors in 
Law70 clearly shaped and framed the analysis in Martin71 in a 
way that was both appropriate and measured. The references to 
human dignity are conclusory rather than analytical but none the 
worse for being so. While the Court could certainly be convicted 
of having a robust view of the scope of judicial expertise, the 
matters touched on and debated in Martin72 are organically con-
nected to the concerns of the individuals afflicted with physical 
or mental disability and affected by the actions of government. 
 
Both the regimes in Granovsky73 and Martin74 appear to be blunt and 
over-broad in their impact on persons suffering a variety of disabilities. 
Indeed, are the two populations in Granovsky75 and Martin76 any differ-
ent in character? In Martin,77 only some chronic pain sufferers were 
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excluded, albeit all those without objectively verifiable symptoms. In 
Granovsky,78 only those with temporary disabilities as a result of back 
pain were excluded, but all such persons? Although the exclusion in 
Martin79 was by reference to a disability, it was not solely on the basis 
of disability, but rather other relevant concerns coupled with the 
presentation of that type of disability. 
One obvious effect of Martin80 is a clear statement by the Court that 
in certain circumstances the identification of the claimant as a member 
of a historically disadvantaged group will be of little or no impact in an 
equality analysis. The same could also be said of Trociuk.81 
As recognized by the Court, the messages contained within these 
legislative distinctions were each anchored in means which were rele-
vant to the purposes of the legislation. The fact that a mother does not 
acknowledge the father of her children at their birth appears to the writer 
to constitute a relevant fact in how one requires her to register the births 
over the next 30 days and who one allows to select their initial surname? 
The legislative preference of biological mothers and custodial parents in 
the naming of young children may be wrong, but does not seem dis-
criminatory. 
In relation to the regime in Martin the analysis seems strained when 
it strives to view the legislative distinction as based upon a stereotype 
relating to chronic pain sufferers. The Court’s conclusion seems just as 
strong when it criticizes the absence of a correlation between the legisla-
tive goal and those people affected by its chosen means of distinction. In 
this sense a stereotype is condemned because of just such a discrepancy, 
but newly realized means of discrimination may be just as deserving of 
censure without having any historical stereotype associated with them. 
What is surely required is a persuasive criticism of the means chosen by 
the legislature: in Martin that effort seems much more developed and 
sound than in Trociuk.  
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Equality remains an elusive concept. There is a necessary variation 
in the impact on the analysis of the ground of distinction and the charac-
ter of legislative treatment of that distinction. We cannot reasonably 
hope for a formulaic answer which will satisfy all concerned. While 
Law82 can be criticized for excluding little, it has the advantage of in-
cluding all that may be valuable in a discrimination analysis. 
The heart of the matter nevertheless remains obscure. When is an 
over-inclusive distinction involving an enumerated ground discrimina-
tory? When is a poor or out-of-date law as a result unconstitutional? It is 
unclear whether the essential human dignity sought to be preserved by 
the Court is being accurately measured in these judgments. 
The identification of the statutory policy in Martin83 seems prefer-
able to that in Trociuk.84 Furthermore, it is easy to comprehend a fair 
and more individualized system of compensation for chronic pain than 
that under review in Martin.85 On the other hand, the legislative choice 
relating to the selecting and changing of surnames in the British Colum-
bia legislation appears to have been supplanted by a judicial adjudica-
tion of the child’s best interests. It is certainly not clear to this writer 
that the judicial system is preferable to that selected by the legislature. 
The court is not deaf to the risk that the application of section 15 
might be corrosive of its public acceptance. In dismissing the section 15 
claims in R. v. Malmo-Levine; R. v. Caine based upon discrimination 
against the class of recreational marijuana users, Iacobucci J. stated: 
…To uphold Malmo-Levine’s argument for recreational choice (or 
lifestyle protection) on the basis of s. 15 of the Charter would simply be to 
create a parody of a noble purpose.86 
What does seem to be occurring, however, is that the Court is 
gradually developing a jurisprudence where in a common-law-like fash-
ion legislators are learning what kinds of distinctions will survive con-
stitutional scrutiny and which will not. Blunt legislative exclusions 
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which can be characterized as arbitrary when founded upon enumerated 
or analogous grounds represent legislative choices that must be ap-
proached carefully by legislators.  
The Court is obviously committed to taking section 15(1)’s express 
reference to physical and mental disability seriously. This being said the 
challenges of applying the Law87 analysis to a broadly defined sense of 
disability in relation to the crafting of government programs is likely to 
create great and difficult problems. Part of the problem is identifying 
people with any recognizably different medical condition as suffering a 
physical disability: so the two populations of back injury sufferers in 
Granovsky88 are entitled to have their treatment under the benefits re-
gime compared under a section 15(1) analysis. Similarly, the population 
of chronic pain sufferers is treated as a distinct population in Martin.89 
The other part of the challenge is that determining whether discrimina-
tion has been proven is made more complex when the principal demand 
on government is for accommodation, as was the case in Eldridge v. 
British Columbia (Attorney General).90 
These cases can be reconciled. Eldridge91 required the provision of 
deaf translators for access to hospital services and is a case of accom-
modating access to the general medical system. Martin92 is a case of 
arbitrary and blanket exclusion by express reference to a particular dis-
ability. Granovsky93 is simply a case of differing benefits being crafted 
to deal with different conditions.  
This may be too easy. No evidence for a clear need for publicly 
funded translators for deaf people using medical services is referred to 
in Eldridge.94 The unfairness of someone suffering repeated disabilities 
from back injury losing their qualification for public benefits when 
someone having a more chronic condition benefits from a relief from 
qualification is a type that is a common feature of benefit programs, but 
that makes it no less real. Beneath the surface of the arbitrary exclusion 
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in Martin95 appear to be very real differences in the conditions being 
considered by the legislation.  
In the 2004 term, the Court heard arguments in the Auton (Guardian 
ad Litem of) v. British Columbia (Attorney General)96 case from British 
Columbia. In that case, the Courts below found that the province’s re-
fusal to extend public funding for intensive behavioural therapy for 
autistic children constituted a violation of section 15(1). The case in-
volves a challenge to the design of the publicly funded medical system, 
which does not include behavioural therapy in its funded services. It 
also concerns a controversial and expensive therapy that is considered 
critical by those caring for children suffering from autism. This case will 
no doubt give the Court the opportunity to clarify and advance our un-
derstanding of section 15(1) in perhaps its most challenging context to 
date.  
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